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In the context of the 2009 atrocities in Lanka, in this paper I attempt to 
think through a set of questions about visibility, witness, suffering, 
accountability and disposability as they are played out in the relations 
between the necro-geo-politics of global institutions and the 
patchworks of local and transnational movements that attempt to 
materialize peoples’ suffering and realize the possibility of justice 
within fragile and compromised frameworks. 
 
In an article in the London Review of Books, Mahmood Mamdani 
identifies George Washington Williams, the first black member of the 
Ohio State legislature, and also a lawyer and Baptist Minister, with 
formulating the concept of ‘crimes against humanity’ to describe the 
atrocities committed by Belgium in the Congo Free State in the late 
nineteenth century (Mamdani 2013, p. 33). Williams, Mamdani 
observes, provided the prototype for the form of justice, initiated at the 
Nuremberg trials, that came to be known as victims’ justice. The 
Nuremberg process, underwritten by the United States and 
administered in the name of the victorious allies, was understood at 
the time as inaugurating a new model of justice, one in which a liberal 
geopolitical order of states would be seen to administer a transparent 
and transnational justice in the name of the victims or, as they came 
to termed in post-Holocaust literature, the survivors (Mamdani 2013, 
p. 33). Mamdani doesn’t mention whether any of the Nuremberg 
prosecutors invoked George Washington Williams, or the tortured, 
raped and murdered Congolese in whose name he had first called, 
unsuccessfully, for an ‘International Commission of Inquiry’ (Mamdani 
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2013, p. 33). Their figures, it would seem, only enter the story of 
international justice at a distance, as shadowy precursors. 
George Washington Williams’s eloquent and meticulously detailed 
Open letter indicting King Leopold for the atrocities of the Congo is 
one of the founding documents for international law, as well as a key 
document of anti-colonialism, although it remains relatively unfamiliar 
among postcolonial scholars. It was more than a half century later, at 
Nuremberg, that Williams’ call for an international judicial commission 
was to be taken up. That foundational international judicial 
commission was, however, not convened to acknowledge or redress 
the forms of colonial atrocity Williams had decried in the Congo; 
rather, it was in the service of what was understood by the allies as 
the imperative to restore justice within the clearly delineated 
boundaries of a European order, an order from which the subject of 
the colonial had to be excluded, for both victors and vanquished. One 
of the underlying tensions between the U.S. and the British and 
French allies after their success in WW2 was precisely around the 
topic of imperialism, as the latter fought to stave off decolonization in 
India, Africa and Southeast Asia. And it is only the exclusion of the 
colonial violence from the space of a racially and geographically 
bounded European justice that makes intelligible the logic of 
reparation initiated at Nuremberg: a logic that lead to establishment of 
the state of Israel as a settler colony on seemingly unpeopled ground, 
terra nullius. This was the international order’s act of restitution, 
outside its own limits, for the victims of Nuremberg, a restitution which 
continues to be exacted upon Palestinian bodies and lands (Mamdani 
2013). Operations such as the 2014 ‘Protective Edge’ offensive in 
Gaza instantiate this logic. At the same time, this authority to 
implement justice outside its own limits, in the name of specific victims 
of war, must be seen as the corollary of the authority to declare ‘just 
wars’ in the name of freedom outside its own territories that, as 
Denise da Silva writes, has ‘been deployed to mark the ethical 
boundaries of post-Enlightenment Europe’ (Silva, 2005, p. 122).  
To remember George Washington Williams’ call for justice for the 
Congo is to signal the exclusions and limits that constitute the order of 
international justice in the era initiated by the Nuremberg process, a 
little over half a century ago today. Nuremberg stands as inaugurating 
the contemporary order of international justice, both in its symbolic 
and performative dimensions and in the procedural and juridical 
precedents it set for the punishment of genocidal state violence and 
crimes against humanity. This new order of justice, as one dispensed 
or underwritten by an ethical, united international order in the name of 
the victims, is one that has ramified in various forms, extending from 
formal tribunals and inquiries of retributive justice to transitional justice 
mechanisms, truth commissions, official apologies, measures of 
restitution, reparations, and so on. Despite critical distinctions 
between these various judicial and quasi-judicial processes, what they 
have in common is their implicit or explicit recourse to the 
assumptions and practices that visibly locate the international order as 
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the initiator, overseer and/or guarantor of justice against forms of 
exterminatory violence perpetrated by states or state-like agents.  
This essay, originally delivered as a keynote address at a conference 
titled ‘Postcolonial Justice’ held in Potsdam, Germany, begins with 
this marking of a series of key sites—Congo, Belgium, Nuremberg, 
Israel, Gaza—that links past and present, colonial and colonizing 
worlds. Together these names outline a map of international justice on 
which to locate the central events I discuss in this paper: the mass 
deaths of tens of thousands of civilians on the beaches of Mullivaikkal 
in northeast Sri Lanka. Cutting across colonial and postcolonial 
geographies and temporalities, the names and places that traverse 
this essay trace convergent and divergent histories as well as the 
crossed and missed connections, the lags, relays and blockages, of 
the fraught interplay of law and justice. It was at Potsdam that 
Churchill, Stalin and Truman agreed, as initiators of a new order, to 
institute a legal tribunal to be held at Nuremberg for the purpose of 
adjudicating on Nazi war crimes. How do the terms and premises of 
that founding moment set the terms for how international justice will 
be dispensed, and be seen to be dispensed, for the future?   
In recent years, not only distant geographies, but the spaces of the 
colonial past are being brought within the purview of an international 
order of justice, as in the case of the 1992 inquiry into the Stolen 
Generations of Aboriginal children in Australia. More recently, the 
charges of torture against the British government by former members 
of the Mau Mau resulted in a finding against the former by its own 
High Court in 2013. A second set of questions for this essay centre on 
the terms on which the atrocities of the past and present enter the 
order of international justice, and the means by which they become 
perceptible and recognizable. How do they come to constitute the 
terms of entry, for both perpetrator and victim, into a new international 
order, an order whose continuity, chastened and purified, can be 
written as one that is visibly post-colonial, global and reconciled? 
Elsewhere I track how the dialectics of exposure, denial and 
acknowledgment through which colonial atrocities—invariably figured 
as shocking and revelatory disclosures—are recognized operate to 
ensure the continuities of liberal empire under the sign of the post-
colonial (Perera 2014; Nguyen 2012). Here I consider the operative 
relations of the dynamics between the public revelation of 
contemporary atrocities and the reproduction of an international order 
of justice.  
The emergence of new models of international justice is accompanied 
by a burgeoning of attendant political practices, cultural forms and 
subjectivities, by the proliferation of discourses and disciplines of 
international law, human rights and humanitarianism, and of the 
organizations that administer them, as well as by popular 
mobilizations and understandings of all of these manifestations. This 
discussion is located in the slippages and connectivities among these 
discourses, technologies and institutions, and in the spaces where law 
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and war, justice and geopolitics, converge and collide. The theorist 
Eyal Weizman whose work on the siege of Gaza in particular I draw 
on, notes that, ‘international law and the systems of courts and 
tribunals that exercise and enact it are not conceived as spaces 
outside the conflict, but rather as being among the battlegrounds 
internal to it’ (2011, p. 292). Yet despite the fact that the institutions of 
international law do not occupy a transcendental space outside or 
above the conflicts they seek to adjudicate, and are incommensurate 
to justice (Pugliese 2004; 2014), law continues to function as the 
primary site of the ethical call and quest for justice. The force of this 
ethical call for an international justice of accountability and redress 
continues to resound through George Washington Williams’ open 
letter to Leopold of Belgium to the present.      
My discussion of the end of the war in Sri Lanka in May 2009 is 
shaped by questions of the limits and possibilities of an international 
order of justice and its economies of perception and visibility. In March 
2014, five years after the war’s conclusion, the United Nations Human 
Rights Council (UNHRC) passed a resolution calling for an 
international inquiry into the conduct of the war in its final phase 
(OHCHR 2014). Just under five years earlier, the same body had 
passed a contrary resolution, praising the Lankan state’s victory in the 
war (HRW 2009). In what follows I track the complicated stages 
between these two resolutions, and their implications for the 
possibilities and limits of international justice. In the rest of this paper I 
use the formulation The International Community (TIC) to signify the 
global institutions that are seen to administer and adjudicate matters 
of international justice.  
The final stage of the war in Lanka corresponds with Israel’s 
Operation Cast Lead in Gaza in late 2008 and early 2009 (see, for 
example, Ratner 2012, p. 801). These two brutal siege operations, 
with their terrible toll in civilian lives and environmental wreckage 
share a number of features. In each of these siege situations, the 
perpetrators—the Israeli or Lankan states—represented themselves 
as extended fronts of the war on terror whose actions were vindicated 
by the ruthlessness of the terrorists they were facing. Their tactics 
were positioned as comparable to U.S. counterinsurgency tactics in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. After the end of the war, counterinsurgency 
(COIN) theorists were quick to debate whether the ‘Sri Lankan Model’ 
could provide ‘a different counterinsurgency template’ for states such 
as Pakistan, Myanmar as well as the U.S. and Israel (Beehner 2010). 
Like the contradictory resolutions on Sri Lanka, the United Nations’ 
Goldstone report on the Gaza death-siege has a fraught and tortuous 
history in the UN. 
As Eyal Weizman and others point out, it is at the fringes and in ‘an 
endless series of diffused border conflicts’ that the body of 
international law is constantly reshaped and tested (2011, p. 91). 
Through my analysis of this war in a border zone and at the colonial 
limits, I track a set of questions about what forms of accountability are 
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at play in processes of international justice that, even as they call for 
accountability for crimes against humanity, reproduce and reinscribe 
the very conditions that have rendered those lives already unlivable, 
disposable: bare life. At stake in these questions are the economies of 
visibility that underwrite international justice processes; the 
technologies of perception that render bodies visible or invisible and 
the forms of what Diana Taylor names ‘percepticide’ that structure the 
‘given-to-be-seen’ and the ‘given-to-be-invisible’ of dirty wars at local 
as well as international scales (1997, p. 119). If dynamics of revelation 
and recognition are central to the credible functioning of an order of 
international justice, how are conditions of suffering and atrocity made 
perceptible within that order, and on what terms are accountabilities 
assumed and assigned for them? Within the order of international 
justice on what terms are subjects of war’s atrocities rendered visible 
or invisible, and what are the structures and identities that enable their 
entry into global perceptibility? The analysis that follows centres on 
the satellite images recorded by various international agencies of the 
brutal final weeks of the war as forms of remote monitorship that 
represent, both metaphorically and materially, the hovering, telescopic 
oversight of international justice over a seemingly obscure war.             
In Plain Sight 
In May 2009, the thirty-year war between the Lankan state and the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) ended in the latter’s utter 
military defeat. During the preceding months, as LTTE forces fell back 
before the Lankan army’s advance, the latter unilaterally declared a 
sequence of ‘Civilian Security Zones’ (CSZs) and ‘No Fire Zones’ 
(NFZs) across the Vanni region in the north east of the country. The 
stated aim of these zones was to protect displaced civilians caught up 
in the retreat, voluntarily and involuntarily mixed in with LTTE cadres 
fighting to hold on to their rapidly contracting territory. In practice, 
although the defeat of the LTTE was now all but inevitable, the entire 
people of the region were shelled and bombed all the way through 
several temporary homes to a location that was pinpointed by the 
state’s own tactics to become ‘the most bitterly contested’ 
battleground of the entire war (UTHR[J] 2009b, p. 17). This punitive 
approach to the local inhabitants positioned them as undifferentiated 
enemies and interlopers on the land, despite the states rhetorical 
insistence that they were hapless ‘hostages’ in need of rescue from 
the LTTE.     
Following a statement that the Lankan government would no longer 
guarantee their safety, the International Community (TIC), in the form 
of the United Nations and NGOs, had withdrawn by painful stages 
several months before, abandoning both their local staff and the 
general population, although assuring them of a speedy return 
(Malathy 2012, p. 143). This trope of retreat is a familiar one in global 
human rights and international justice narratives, and one to which I 
will return. As happened more publicly in Rwanda or Bosnia, this 
moment of retreat is often coupled with a repeated insistence on the 
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helplessness or impotence of international institutions (Williams 
2010). The moment of formal withdrawal, I argue, constitutes a type of 
crux of visibility at which international justice publicly recognises itself 
in the very moment of its turning away, as it is called to an admission 
of its own failure. At the edges of its field of vision, in this very act of 
turning away, it sets the conditions of (in)visibility for the violence 
shortly to be unleashed, delimits the ground of its (our) knowledge of 
the human suffering that will ensue, and determines the measures by 
which accountability for that suffering will be assessed.  
It is now indisputable from the evidence of classified diplomatic cables 
released by Wikileaks and other sources that, despite its withdrawal 
from the scene, TIC remained well appraised of what was under way 
on a seemingly invisible and inaccessible patch of ground in the Vanni 
during the last months and weeks of the war in Lanka. This 
awareness of what was transpiring is evidenced in the nickname 
international officials adopted for the region, even as a series of No 
Fire Zones were nominated by the state in a show of compliance with 
formal conventions for the protection of civilians in combat conditions. 
Exposing that fiction for what it was, diplomats and international NGO 
workers, in a display of graveyard humour or, perhaps, a rare effort at 
accuracy, would refer to the beleaguered territory of the Vanni among 
themselves as The Cage. This is the title of one of the earliest books 
about the final days of the war, written by a former UN official, Gordon 
Weiss (Weiss 2011).  
Between January and May 2009 the civilians trapped in The Cage 
were hunted by the Lankan army on the one hand, and held, often 
forcibly, as cover by the LTTE forces on the other. They were already 
weak and ill due to the systematic under-reporting of their numbers by 
the state, so that the carefully calculated Malthusian ‘humanitarian 
minimum’ of food aid dispensed to them by TIC was woefully 
inadequate (UTHR [J] 2009b, p. 20; ICEP 2014). Incredibly, a UN 
internal review 2012 states that ‘The UN believed there to be about 
350,000, but did most of its assistance planning on the basis of 
200,000 beneficiaries’, despite being aware that the ‘LTTE may have 
taken up to 20% of assistance that reached the Wanni’ (UN 2012, p. 
55). The government put the figure of people in the region at only 
70,000. Despite the starvation conditions in which these ‘beneficiaries’ 
were placed by the government, the LTTE and the TIC, continuing 
attacks from shells and bombs from government forces compelled 
them to keep on the run. An official interviewed by the BBC journalist 
Francis Harrison reported:  
Ten displacements was the norm, and many arrived on foot. We 
would give them a hut. We kept finding people under mango trees; 
if they’d been hit by artillery in the night they just ran and jumped on 
the first tractor out. They had no cooking utensils. We started by 
handing out kits to construct shelters, and then we realised that 
they were building them and five days later, the same people were 
displacing. So it was pointless. We resorted to giving out three 
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pieces of wood and a bit of tarpaulin so that they could carry it with 
them. (Harrison 2012, Loc. 423)  
Displacing and displacing yet again, carrying with them the pitiful 
means for the barest of shelters, three wooden sticks and a piece of 
tarp, feeding themselves on leaves boiled in sea water, hundreds of 
thousands of people made their way by weary stages in a frantic zig-
zag across the no-exit of The Cage. Mired in shit and bloody corpses, 
as one witness described it (UTHR [J] 2009b, p. 96), beset on every 
side by infernal sights, sounds and smells, they found themselves in 
the last days of the war, at the very edge of the third and final of the 
No Fire Zones, on a painfully narrow extremity of land at Mullivaikkal, 
hemmed in by opposing armies, a lagoon on one side, the sea on the 
other. 
Complementing TIC’s rueful foreknowledge of the predicament of 
those ensnared in The Cage, throughout this period the conflict zone 
was also silently monitored via what Allen Feldman terms the powerful 
‘securocractic’ optical technologies that have served to image famine-
scapes, disaster-scapes, war-scapes and other cartographies of 
geopolitical risk across the globe since 2001 (Feldman 2006, p. 208), 
and that function as part of the growing military-visual complex 
(Mirzoeff 2005, pp. 12-13). Such imaging technologies, despite their 
aspirations to omnipresence and omniscience, are marked by their 
blind spots and zones of unseeing that screen, edit and structure 
objects, acts and relations within their field of vision, as they are also 
subject to mediation and framing by the national and supra-national 
agencies which attempt to control their meanings.   
From on high, the frantic displacing of people through the scrub and 
swamp-scape of The Cage was logged by Google Earth and in more 
detail by the U.S. Defense Department’s National Geo-Spatial 
Intelligence Agency (Weiss 2011, p. 207) as well as by the UN’s 
Institute for Training and Research-Operational Satellite Applications 
Programme (UNITAR/UNOSAT). A 2011 report confirms that 
UNOSAT was ‘requested by the UN Resident Humanitarian 
Coordinator in Colombo, Sri Lanka to provide detailed imagery 
analysis during the final months of the civil war’ (UNITAR 2011, p. 17). 
However, footage from these sources was only selectively released at 
the time, with UNITAR/UNOSAT receiving criticism for withholding the 
images from April 19, 2009, after first making them briefly available 
online (Lee 2009; Visweswaran 2013, p. 239). Even more disturbingly, 
the information gathered by the UNOSAT images was subsequently 
discredited by the UN’s own Resident Coordinator in Colombo who 
assured the government in writing that the visual evidence they 
presented of aerial bombardment was ‘partial and provisional’ (UN 
2012, p. 17). The letter was released by the government to dismiss 
concerns about the shocking rate of civilian deaths inside its own 
declared No Fire Zone.   
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A crucial sequence of satellite images, only made publicly available 
after the war, documents the systematic destruction of the third and 
final of the No Fire Zones, recording the stage-by-stage deterioration 
of The Cage as it is meticulously pounded into wasteland (see Images 
1 and 2 below). 
      
 
Image 1: Satellite image of The Cage 
(http://groundviews.org/2012/09/12/the-end-of-war-in-sri-lanka-
captured-for-posterity-by-google-earth/)  
Under the impervious gaze of a sovereign technicity, the teeming dark 
green of this desperate enclave, thickly flecked with the luminescent 
white and blue of UN-issue tarpaulin, dulls and deadens, transforming 
into a corrugated topography of desert and dust. The beach sand, no 
longer white, dyes to an ominous rust; the brilliant blue-green of the 
surrounding waters turns clogged and murky. Against the scorched 
earth, a few tatters of dirty plastic are all that remain of any slight 
promise of human shelter this wrecked ground once held out.  
 








The orbiting gaze makes no claim to interpret or adjudicate the 
changes it records in the soundless landscape. Its view remains, as 
Lisa Parks puts it in her essay on Srebrenica, that of super-vision, and 
of over-sight (Parks 2010, p. 264). The sudden disappearance of a 
cluster of blue and white flecks between one day and the next, after a 
period of what looks like cloud cover, may signify the use of scorching 
white phosphorus gas to screen advancing troops. The appearance of 
craters and piles of debris on ground where tents once stood, the 
reddening of a patch of sandy soil, are one kind of evidence of the use 
of weaponry (cluster munitions, multiple barrel rocket launchers, 
repeated aerial bombing) criminally at odds with the conditions at 
hand, where hundreds of thousands of civilians and wounded were 
closely packed in with a small number of enemy fighters (ICEP 2014). 
In the Lankan government’s stated view, on the other hand, the pits 
and deep indentations on the coruscated earth of the NFZ signify 
bunkers and trenches dug for defensive purposes (Weiss 2011, p. 
206).  
What is indisputable is that each bright speck of plastic once 
represented a human cluster, a shelter built with three wooden sticks 
and a piece of tarp, a flimsy refuge for a family with children and 
elderly, or perhaps a makeshift medical tent for the wounded and ill. 
You can count the dots. After the fact, the UN did just that, averaging 
five people per dot, to estimate that, outside the capital city of 
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Colombo, this was the second largest concentration of people in the 
country. It was also, for those few months, said to be the largest 
refugee camp in the world, a ground that had held out the only hope 
of survival for 360,000 people (UN 2012, p. 55; Weiss 2011, p. 206; 
Harrison 2012, Loc 448).  
No soundtrack of hovering aircraft or shock of heavy munitions 
accompanies the over-seeing satellite scenographies of Mullivaikkal. 
One commentator, indeed, describes these soundless frames as 
‘much like a cartoon’ (Weiss 2011, p. 206). As Derek Gregory has 
discussed with regard to footage of drone strikes, the silence that 
attends these images reinforces an ‘intrinsically visual economy that 
imbues the operation with a peculiarly truncated meaning’ (2014, p. 
10).  
The pixellation of these silent, depthless images was deliberately 
formulated by Google Earth so as to obscure any view of a human 
body (Weizman and Manfredi 2013, p. 186). Atrocity and suffering on 
this human scale remain structurally imperceptible in the over-sight of 
the orbital gaze. Yet what is still represented in these images is a 
stark and shocking violence, visited on a seemingly unpeopled 
landscape. This is a violence that unfolds spatially—literally on the 
ground—as well as temporally in the relation of one frame to one 
another; its violence resides as much on what happens between the 
frames, in their very sequentiality. Plenty of direct on-screen evidence 
of the violence visited on human bodies did exist, but would not 
surface among global media until far too late. Although visual 
monitoring technologies might enable, eventually, the perception of ‘a 
topological and continuous relationship between figure/human/object 
and the ground/network/system/assemblage to which it belongs’ 
(Weizman and Manfredi 2013, p. 186), in these disembodied satellite 
scenographies with their broken constellations of dots and blips, no 
screams are heard from the dying, nor the anguished wailing of their 
bereaved; no vulgar traces of blood or shattered bodies: just a god’s 
eye view of a massacre in progress. 
The satellite images of Mullivaikkal have haunted me for many 
months, for what they show of the ground of massacre and for what 
they do not. They are a starting point for my questions about the work 
of bringing the materiality of slaughtered bodies and the suffering of 
survivors into view within a spatial and specular order under which 
mass violence and atrocities are ever more available to be surveilled, 
recorded, archived, and forensically analysed, and yet, paradoxically, 
can be rendered ever more incidental, instrumental or ignorable; and 
of how the biopolitics of global governance play out across 
necropolitical terrains of geopolitical inequality, in relation to those it 
locates as bare life.  
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Lawfare and the Economies of Atrocity  
Compiling witness accounts from The Cage after the LTTE’s defeat, 
the highly respected group University Teachers for Human Rights 
(Jaffna) (UTHR [J]), wrote: ‘what these survivors’ stories make clear is 
that for both parties, the key to military knowledge lay not in brilliant 
strategies, but in an utter disregard for the lives of civilians and 
combatants alike’ (UTHR [J] 2009b, p. 1). The strategies of both 
warring parties in Lanka recklessly wagered the lives of the civilians in 
The Cage on the response of the International Community. At stake 
for each party was the very idea of a separate Tamil homeland 
(Mohan 2014, Loc 441). The government wagered, correctly as it 
turned out, that it could act with impunity to unleash indiscriminate 
violence against the inhabitants of The Cage, banking on TIC’s stance 
on the war on terror, and backed by the staunch support of its major 
arms supplier, China and the indirect and direct support of the U.S. 
(Anderson 2011). While speaking loudly of ‘humanitarian rescue’ of 
‘hostages’ the government adopted a strategy under which ‘the entire 
people was shelled and bombed’ all the way across the region, and 
into The Cage (UTHR [J] 2009b, p. 19). A campaign of brutal rape 
appears to have formed a part of these tactics. A UN official testified 
to Human Rights Watch that ‘a large number of women fleeing from 
the conflict areas during the peak of fighting were sexually assaulted 
... causing a large number of civilians to flee back to the theater of 
conflict to escape the abuse’ by the army (HRW 2013, p. 7). Through 
these means the state carried out a deliberate strategy of violent 
displacement of the civilian Tamil population, including children, the ill, 
the vulnerable and the elderly into zones where they came under fire, 
‘as though to dispel any notion in their minds that the land belonged to 
them’ (UTHR [J] 2009b, p. 19).  
The LTTE strategy was based on the deadly miscalculation, as it 
turned out, that the spectacle of dead and wounded civilians would 
result in an eleventh-hour diplomatic intervention. To this end, it not 
only brutally exposed non-combatants to the government’s brutal 
violence, but also even sought to incite it through means such as firing 
from amid civilian enclaves. The callous indifference demonstrated by 
the LTTE towards the lives of the Tamil population it claimed to 
represent was not a final resort undertaken in extremis, but was part 
of its continuing tactics. Rajani Thiranagama, a former supporter of 
the LTTE who became one of its most rigorous critics and was 
assassinated at its hands wrote of its battle with Indian forces in the 
late 1990s, in a poem that is frighteningly prescient:  
Our great defenders and freedom fighters 
lure the enemy right to our door-step 
to the inside of the hospital 
start a fight, . . .   
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And then come the shells, whizzing, whizzing. 
Bloody hell,  
Tigers have withdrawn, while  
We, the sacrificial lambs 
Drop dead in lots.   
              (Thiranagama quoted by Sumathy 2004, p. 145)    
Although some apologists would claim a revolutionary, Fanonian, 
character to the LTTE’s violence, and assert that its downfall was 
caused by requiring from it an impossible level of compliance with the 
norms and conventions of international law (Malathy 2012), the LTTE 
project had lost any liberatory or revolutionary energies it had 
commanded since at least the late 1980s (Hoole et al. 1990; Sumathy 
2001; Manikkalingam 1995; Subramanian 2014; UTHR (J) 2009b).  
Tellingly, in the final days, selected senior members of the LTTE 
leadership hatched a plan with the aid of international journalists and 
diplomats for their own rescue. The Lankan government’s clear 
violation of international law in failing to honor the surrender of these 
LTTE leaders under a white flag has been rightly widely reported and 
condemned as an instance of unlawful killing (UN 2012, p. 86; ICEP 
2014, p. v). However, there is no denying the shocking indifference of 
these leading LTTE figures to the fate of those they planned to leave 
behind while negotiating safe passage for themselves and their 
families. During this same period, LTTE cadres forcibly prevented 
civilians, including families, the wounded and the dying, who sought to 
surrender or flee to government territory from doing so on pain of 
death (UTHR [J] 2009a, p. 1; UTHR [J] 2009b; ICEP 2014). Identifying 
these tactics of the LTTE, however, does not in any way exempt the 
state from its responsibility for its continuing program of murderous 
violence against Tamil citizens or vindicate its systematic campaign of 
bombing, killing and rape in the war.  
Staked on the limit-points and thresholds that constitute International 
Humanitarian Law (IHL), the tactics of a cruel indifference to the 
human toll adopted by both sides approximate to a form of lawfare, 
under which warring parties weigh up the odds of killing or saving 
lives against the legal definitions, categories and limits that delineate 
crimes against humanity. In such instances, Weizman remarks, ‘the 
“law making character” inherent in military violence’ becomes evident, 
as the boundaries of the laws of war are tested and extended (2011, 
p. 94). The ability to mobilise public opinion by the parties concerned, 
both during and after the violence, is critical to this kind of lawfare, 
and to the ways in which the conflict is perceived by national and 
international publics, both in real-time and in retrospect.  
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Throughout the last phase of the war and for months after, the Lankan 
government maintained that it had carried out a ‘humanitarian 
operation’ with a policy of ‘zero civilian casualties’ in the No Fire Zone 
(Ministry of Defence, Sri Lanka 2010). The UN to all intents and 
purposes accepted these egregious assertions at face value, 
maintaining a ‘discreet and hopeful approach’ to the Lankan state 
despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary (Weiss 2011, p. 205; 
see also UN 2012). An internal review conducted in 2012 could not be 
more damning of the role played by the UN, both locally and at its 
highest levels:   
There was a continued reluctance among UNCT [UN Country 
Team] institutions to stand up for the rights of the people they were 
mandated to assist. In Colombo, some senior staff did not perceive 
the prevention of killing of civilians as their responsibility—and 
agency and department heads at UNHQ were not instructing them 
otherwise. Seen together, the failure of the UN to adequately 
counter the Government’s under-estimation of population numbers 
in the Wanni [sic.], the failure to adequately confront the 
Government on its obstructions to humanitarian assistance, the 
unwillingness of the UN in UNHQ and Colombo to address 
Government responsibility for attacks that were killing civilians, and 
the tone and content of UN communications with the Government 
on these issues, collectively amounted to a failure by the UN to act 
within the scope of institutional mandates to meet protection 
responsibilities. (UN 2012, pp. 26-27, my emphasis) 
Shortly after the LTTE defeat, the UN Human Rights Commission 
even passed a resolution commending the government and its 
commitment to human rights. This despite the objections of its own 
High Commissioner for Human Rights at the time, Navi Pillai. In 
marked contrast to Pillai, who had openly voiced her concerns at the 
loss of civilian lives throughout the previous months, UN Secretary-
General Ban Ki-Moon praised the government for its ‘tremendous 
efforts’ (HRW 2009; see also UN 2012, pp. 66-67 and p. 95 for a 
discussion of the ongoing disagreements between the Secretary-
General’s Office and the Office of the Commissioner of Human Rights 
on responding to the catastrophic numbers of civilian dead). Ban 
visited Lanka to mark the formal end of hostilities and, accepting the 
government’s advice, did not deign to enter the battle zone; survivors 
from Mullivaikkal who were held incommunicado in the ‘welfare 
villages’ for refugees testified that they did not receive so much as a 
passing glance from the blandly smiling UN Secretary-General.  
Among member states of the UN, especially in the region, Lankan 
army tactics were widely publicised as possible models for their own 
internal wars. The Indian Prime Minister declared that India would 
adopt the ‘Sri Lankan Solution’ to deal with its insurgent movements 
within its own borders (d’Souza 2012, p. 13), while Pakistan and 
Myanmar sought its advice (Beehner 2010).  Basking in its victory, the 
Lanka Defence Ministry conducted a three-day conference, with 
sponsorship by two Chinese arms manufacturers, titled ‘Defeating 
terrorism—Sri Lankan experience’ to share the secrets of its success 
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with other states (Haviland 2011). Among the speakers was none 
other than David Kilcullen, an Australian army official who was Chief 
Strategist at the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism in 
the U.S. State Department in 2005-6, and a contributor to the U.S. 
army’s controversial Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency (2006). 
The following year, Kilcullen would act as senior counter-insurgency 
advisor to General David Petraeus in Iraq. The Bush administration 
included a strong friend of the Lankan government in the form of 
James Clad, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for South and 
Southeast Asia, until President Obama replaced Bush in 2009. It was 
during Clad’s tenure, Jon Lee Anderson reports in the New Yorker, 
that U.S. support was ‘crucial’ in enabling the Lankan military to 
destroy the LTTE’s naval fleet, the Sea Pigeons. Seven LTTE ships 
loaded with military resupplies were sunk on the basis of satellite 
intelligence provided by the U.S. in 2008. ‘From then on, the Tigers 
were on the run, herded ineluctably into shrinking territory’ (Anderson 
2011). 
Kilcullen’s reflections on ‘The Sri Lankan Solution’ must be read in the 
context of the COIN operations he helped put in place for the U.S. in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. His presentation at the ‘Defeating Terrorism’ 
conference included high praise for the tactics adopted by the Lankan 
army, and identifies several instances of its ‘best practice in 
counterinsurgency’, such as ‘tactical innovation’ and adaptability 
(Kilcullen 2011). Kilcullen went on to commend the way in which the 
military had ‘developed the soldier himself, nurturing professionalism 
within the army and revitalising confidence in the organisation itself’ 
(Kilcullen 2011). Delivered two years after the war’s end, when the 
horrific abuses of rape, torture and execution of captured civilians and 
enemy fighters perpetrated by the Lankan military had been well 
documented, these remarks about Lanka’s successes in ‘nurturing 
professionalism’ are in keeping with the official response to the 
atrocities perpetrated by U.S. forces in their COIN operations in Iraq 
and Afghanistan. The ways in which the practices of the U.S. military 
in the war on terror licensed, and were adapted in, other conflicts in 
other parts of the world still remain to be fully documented. One 
instance, as I discuss elsewhere, is how the torture and abuse 
revealed in the Abu Ghraib images are mirrored and restaged in the 
trophy videos recorded by Lankan soldiers on the beaches of 
Mullivaikkal (Perera 2014b). These videos of the war in Lanka are 
indicative of the mobility and communicability of Abu Ghraib’s trophy 
bodies across other wars, racio-ethnic divides and geographies, and 
the new grammars, repertoires and technologies of terror unleashed 
in the wake of the war on terror. 
The atrocities committed at Mullivaikkal, together with the Lankan 
state’s strategy of deliberately displacing and killing Tamil civilians 
clearly instantiate the former’s identification of itself as a superior 
occupying power dealing with a conquered people. Kilcullen was 
unequivocal in endorsing the lethal force deployed against its own 
citizens by the Lankan state:  
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The government displayed in this case unshakeable political will 
opposing all external and internal pressure for a ceasefire. That 
political top cover provided the time, space and support that was 
needed for the free execution of the strategy. The nation of Sri 
Lanka is very fortunate in its armed forces, but the armed forces in 
this case were fortunate in the political leadership that they 
received. (Kilcullen 2011)  
Fortunate indeed, the nation that has both an army and a political 
leadership with the stomach ‘for the free execution of the strategy’, 
i.e., the strategy of knowingly targeting non-combatants with 
murderous firepower.i Although Kilcullen ended his speech with some 
standard admonitions about the need to win over the civilian 
population in the aftermath of the war, his speech overall strongly 
endorses the Lankan state’s actions, and is in line with the U.S. 
approach to the war as a COIN operation.  
Between the ‘top-cover’ provided by the Lankan political leadership 
and the ‘over-sight’ of TIC, the civilians trapped in The Cage stood 
little chance. In the five years since the killing fields of Mullivaikkal, a 
series of reports by various international bodies details precisely the 
forms of violence involved in the ‘free execution’ of the Lankan 
military’s counterinsurgency tactics (ICEP 2014; ICG 2010; UN 2012; 
HRW 2013). The accumulated disclosures of atrocity, including 
witness testimonies and trophy videos recorded by government 
soldiers themselves, eventually led to a reversal of the 2009 UN 
Human Rights Council (HRC) resolution that congratulated the 
Lankan government on its victory. In 2012, 2013 and 2014 a 
sequence of increasingly more forceful UNHRC resolutions called for 
an inquiry into the war crimes committed at Mullivaikkal. The 
International Community, which played such a critical role during the 
war when it lent its support to the Lankan state in the name of COIN 
and the global war on terror has, in the ensuing five years, become 
critical to the writing of the war into history, as it comes to recognise, 
purportedly for the first time, ‘credible evidence of war crimes’ that 
were perpetrated in plain sight (UN 2011). These failures of the UN 
are itemized, as mentioned above, with remarkable openness in the 
2012 ‘Report Of The Secretary-General’s Internal Review Panel On 
United Nations Action In Sri Lanka’. Although several passages of the 
report are redacted, it makes plain the grave failures of United Nations 
officials, both on the ground and at its centre of operations, to fulfil 
their core responsibilities. The report further pinpoints the failures of 
the Security Council itself: ‘In the absence of clear Security Council 
backing, the UN’s actions lacked adequate purpose and direction ... 
The tone, content and objectives of UNHQ’s engagement with 
Member States regarding Sri Lanka were heavily influenced by what it 
perceived Member States wanted to hear, rather than by what 
Member States needed to know if they were to respond’ (UN 2012, 
pp. 27-28).  
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‘A gun in one hand, the Human Rights Charter in the other’ 
The contradictory roles played by TIC, in the form of the United 
Nations and its agencies and member states, together with the 
questions of visibility and witness to which they give rise, return again 
and again to the guiding principles on which the latter’s actions are 
premised, the bases of its authorising instruments and the nature of 
the publics it addresses and to whom it holds itself accountable. 
Weizman argues that the entire apparatus of human rights, 
humanitarianism and international law are not separate from, but 
inextricably entwined with, economies of violence and ‘have become 
the crucial means by which the economy of violence is calculated and 
managed’ (2011, p. 4). In his studies of Operation Cast Lead, the 
2008-9 siege of Gaza, which he terms ‘the proper noun for the horror 
of our humanitarian present’, Weizman analyses how technologies for 
managing war’s violence, such as ‘spatial organizations and physical 
instruments, technical standards, and systems of monitoring’, now 
function to ‘become the means for exercising contemporary violence 
and for governing the displaced, the enemy and the unwanted’ (2011, 
pp. 4-5). Allowing states the space for, in Kilcullen’s words above, ‘the 
free execution of the strategy’ in their campaigns to regulate 
displaced, enemy and unwanted populations, the role of TIC becomes 
one of the close calibration, oversight and calculation of violence. In 
Operation Cast Lead, for example, a spokesperson for Israel assured 
a global audience: ‘We have international lawyers at every level of 
command whose job it is to authorize targeting decisions, rules of 
engagement’ (McGreal 2009). 
Caught between ‘keeping violence at a low enough level to limit 
civilian suffering, and at a level high enough to bring a decisive end to 
the war and bring peace’ (Weizman 2011, p. 9), TIC’s interventions 
are structured by a set of ‘moral technologies’ for observing, 
measuring, quantifying and managing violence. The recourse to such 
moral technologies in the judgments made by UN officials is clearly 
identified in the 2012 Internal Review as among the contributing 
factors in the mass deaths at Mullivaikkal. In particular the review 
pinpoints the moral calculations officials made:  
(i) choosing not to speak up about Government and LTTE broken 
commitments and violations of international law was seen as the 
only way to increase UN humanitarian access;  
(ii) choosing to focus briefings to the Security Council on the 
humanitarian situation rather than on the causes of the crisis and 
the obligations of the parties to the conflict was seen as a way to 
facilitate constructive engagement. (2012, p. 26) 
The guiding principle of the moral technologies Weizman discusses, 
that of identifying ‘the lesser evil’, in effect functions to establish 
thresholds of acceptability for conditions of unliveable violence and 
preventable death. The review names the critical distinction that 
needs to be made between a focus on the ‘humanitarian situation’ in 
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isolation and the identification of the political actions that are 
responsible for producing the ‘humanitarian situation’ in the first place.   
Weizman focuses in particular on the ‘technological continuum’ 
between military violence and the legal and quantitative mechanisms 
used to assess that violence in order to comply with minimum 
humanitarian thresholds: the calculation of the ‘proportionality’, usually 
in retrospect, and, by an extension of this logic, the weighing up of its 
levels of permissibility and legitimacy, summed up in the chilling 
question ‘how much is too much?’ (Weizman 2011, pp. 122). What 
are the relations between practices of accounting and the process of 
accountability? Do TIC’s post-atrocity actuarial practices of 
enumerating, adding, calculating, aggregating, balancing and 
summing up presume objects whose worth is commensurate to their 
weighty efforts? How many collateral deaths are acceptable in the 
execution of a targeted killing? What is the ‘mathematical minimum’ of 
homes or tents that it is permissible to reduce to rubble in order to 
wipe out enemy positions in a COIN operation? What are the 
adequate measures by which a ‘voluntary human shield’, who may be 
lawfully killed after a warning, is distinguished from a ‘non-combatant’ 
entitled to protection under international law?  
In its subsequent 2014 siege of Gaza, revealingly titled Operation 
Protective Edge, the Israeli state responded to charges of 
indiscriminate bombing in its previous campaign by adopting practices 
such as the ‘wake-up call’—sending warning phone or text messages 
to civilians prior to an attack—or the ‘knock on the roof’—a preliminary 
strike by a missile that ‘does not contain an explosive warhead’, to be 
followed closely by one that did (Kishawi 2014). These tactics 
claiming to warn and protect do not only continue to exact a toll of 
civilian lives, as in instances where people were killed by the very 
‘warning’ missiles supposed to save their lives, or were felled as they 
rushed out into the path of an airstrike following a ‘wake-up call’; as 
Sami Kishawi writes, these practices also have the effect of allowing 
‘Israel to kill two birds with one stone. ... It can publicly claim that it 
works to minimize civilian casualties while at the same time killing 
Palestinians wantonly and with impunity’ (Kishawi 2014).  
The tactics Kishawi identifies strikingly parallel the corralling of the 
Tamil population into protective ‘No Fire Zones’ which in effect 
functioned as killing zones. In the latter case, as repeatedly 
documented, no sooner were the coordinates of field hospitals and 
shelters communicated to the military via international channels such 
as the Red Cross than they became, seemingly coincidentally, targets 
for shelling (Channel 4 2012). Assembled within these zones, in close 
proximity to the ‘enemy’, all civilian activities became suspect and 
potential targets: among those killed at Mullivaikkal were some 
children milling around a mobile food cart for a free sweet, and others 
playing on the beach for a brief respite from the bunkers (UTHR [J] 
2009b, p. 83; p. 62).  
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In the space of The Cage, combatant and non-combatant, innocent 
and guilty, it seems, were to be distinguished only after the fact, 
depending on whether or not they survived: according to a statement 
by the Human Rights Minister, the ‘soldiers saved all Tamil civilians ... 
without shedding a drop of blood’ (UTHR [J] 2009b, p. 102). To have 
been killed or wounded, then, was conclusive evidence of non-civilian 
status: the dead and disabled were being retrospectively designated 
as legitimate targets of war. The Minister’s statement acquires 
intelligibility within a historical context in which the categories of 
‘combatant’ and ‘non-combatant’ are not transparent in international 
law, but the product of prior colonial wars and racialised histories in 
which entire local populations were classified as non-innocent, and 
therefore killable. As Christiane Wilke points out in the context of the 
killing of four children on a beach in Gaza during Operation Protective 
Edge, the insistence on the children as ‘innocent victims’ can serve to 
position other civilian dead as less so: ‘When we invoke international 
law, we need to be cognizant of this [colonial and racialized] past and 
ask ourselves how we use this law and this history: to lessen violence, 
or to justify it; to analyse oppression, or to gloss over it’ (Wilke 2014). 
Weizman identifies the relationship between violence and the 
regulation and management of violence as ‘the condition of collusion 
of ... technologies of humanitarianism, human rights and humanitarian 
law with military and political powers’ and names the conjuncture in 
which they operate ‘the humanitarian present’. As the UN internal 
review unflinchingly observes, this conjunction, with its blurring of the 
distinctions between humanitarianism and military and political 
powers, between the principle of the lesser evil and the legal 
obligations and conventions by which both states and the institutions 
that monitor them are bound, is productive of the very violence it is 
ostensibly aimed to curtail: ‘The UN’s development and humanitarian 
branches were unsuited to the situation and unable to fully address 
the UN’s political and human rights and humanitarian law 
responsibilities; while it was these same responsibilities that became 
most fundamental to the survival of civilians’ (UN 2012, p. 28). A 
statement made by the then Lankan President, Mahinda Rajapaksa, 
takes on an even more chilling cast when considered in the context of 
these calculative tactics of humanitarian present: in his 
commemorative speech on the second anniversary after the 
massacre at Mullivaikkal, Rajapaksa avowed that his ‘soldiers went 
into battle, carrying a gun in one hand, the Human Rights Charter in 
the other’ (Ministry of Defence 2011).  
Accounting for Disposable Lives 
In the humanitarian present with its collusions between humanitarian 
technologies, international law, political force and military power, what 
are the measures by which the identifiable remainder, or excess, 
between allowable and unallowable levels of deadly force is 
accounted for? How are target bodies of the unwanted and out-of-
place at once counted and discounted in the calculus of international 
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justice? Beginning with the satellite scenographies from Google Earth 
and UNOSAT, how are the dead of Mullivaikkal made available for 
viewing as they are also simultaneously rendered ‘structurally 
invisible’ in the official and unofficial fora of international justice? The 
‘at risk’ locations and crisis scenographies compulsively logged by 
global surveillance technologies cannot be dissociated from, and are 
already enframed and mediated by, a prior ordering of spaces, 
populations and life-chances, and by discursive and representational 
histories. Some lives register within this field of perception while 
others are rendered imperceptible under its scopic and legal regimes, 
including those regimes mandated to prevent massacres and 
genocides and protect civilians. Through what means and on what 
terms are these bodies and stories able to enter global view? Activist 
interventions, human rights discourses and popular culture all provide 
access to the formal mechanisms of international tribunals and 
resolutions, but are mediated by the ability to comply with normative 
visual frames of war, atrocity and catastrophe. They structure the 
modalities in which survivor testimonies, media reconstructions and 
other forms of reportage of the atrocity events at Mullivaikkal were 
couched.  
It is in this context I turn to two powerful documentaries by Callum 
Macrae, Sri Lanka’s Killing Fields (2012) and No Fire Zone (2013), 
produced by Britain’s Channel 4. There is much to be said about 
these productions, which have been highly influential in bringing the 
stories of the last phase of the war to global audiences. The 
documentaries provided unprecedented access to the shocking trophy 
videos of their atrocities made by Lankan soldiers, as well as to the 
footage compiled by LTTE media teams, who risked their own lives to 
inform the world of the horrors that were unfolding. Raw, pointed, 
partisan, Macrae’s documentaries are primarily addressed to 
international viewers. The voices most frequently heard in them are 
those of global NGO workers, international experts or diaspora, 
mostly pro-LTTE, Tamils fluent in English. The films are clearly aimed 
at achieving a UN Resolution and international inquiry into the 
atrocities of Mullivaikkal and in fact were screened at the UN prior to 
the 2014 debate on Lanka.  
The opening sequence of No Fire Zone sets the scene for the 
narrative that follows: a series of children’s hands thrust pleadingly 
through a gap in the locked gates of a UN compound, while inside TIC 
plans its withdrawal from the scene. The hands, small, brown, 
disembodied, are accompanied by a low keening, a voiceless plea not 
to be abandoned. A voiceover by an international (white) UN 
spokesperson articulates his sense of frustration at his inability to 
respond to the children’s pleading as the convoy of official SUVs 
speeds away, seemingly helpless in the face of the Lankan 
government’s decree to evacuate. Framed by this scene of the 
international failure to protect the innocent, to have done something, 
the documentary is a ringing call for an international justice that will 
keep faith, if belatedly, with those it failed; it seeks redress for the 
shameful act of abandonment of nearly five years before. The 
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documentary’s narrative logic is one of exposure and shaming of TIC 
in the name of the dead and the survivors. This logic of shame and 
redemption can be said to have been partially assuaged when, on 27 
March 2014, the UNHRC finally did something, by voting to open an 
international investigation into possible war crimes by both the Lankan 
government and the LTTE forces in the final stages of the war.  
The March 2014 Resolution can be seen as one of vindication for the 
activists who sought to bring the events at Mullivaikkal to global 
visibility, and a moment of self-redemption for TIC, in light of the act of 
abandonment with which I began. These scenes of shameful retreat 
are already familiar to global audiences from various accounts of the 
UN’s role in Bosnia, such as the withdrawal from Srebrenica, or in 
fictionalised versions, such as in the film Hotel Rwanda. Yet, the trope 
of TIC’s shaming, its failure to do something, Randall Williams argues, 
works in complex ways that leave broader colonial geopolitical 
relations untouched. He asks: ‘what if shaming operations promote, 
however unwittingly and unintentionally, a necessary misrecognition 
of geopolitics and power that renders them largely ineffective as an 
anti-imperialist political platform?’ (Williams 2010, p. 46). Williams 
goes on to examine the narrative of the UN’s shaming in Hotel 
Rwanda as a move by which TIC disowns its prior responsibilities for 
the past and present, as it authorises more intervention for the future. 
In his fine critique of Hotel Rwanda, Williams asks rhetorically, ‘Who is 
this “we” that should have done something? … What if this “we” were 
already doing a great deal in Rwanda? What if what “we” were doing 
in Rwanda was already in fact a major contributing cause to the 
slaughter?’ (Williams, 2010, p. 50). Later, he goes on to point out that 
the trope of ‘we should have done something’ is premised on the 
presumption of the supreme agency of the west. Similarly, other 
theorists argue that ‘we should have done something’ functions as an 
insidious move to reassert the imperialist prerogative of intervention, 
in the form of the right to protect, or R2P (Jeganathan 2008).  
There is a yet deeper issue here. I would argue that the moment of its 
turning away is simultaneously the moment at which, through the 
staging of the International Community’s failure, humanitarian 
catastrophes come to be identified and recognised as such. In this 
moment of marking of the humanitarian catastrophe as exceptional, a 
breakdown of the international order, the moment of crisis is marked 
also as the moment when that crisis is implicitly resolved, through the 
invocation of its panoply of future measures of redress. The shameful 
moment of international withdrawal sets the scene for the series of 
subsequent inquiries, reports, tribunals, resolutions, sanctions and so 
on to follow, through which the principle of accountability for 
disposable lives will be performed, reinstating the status of 
international law and human rights as the custodians of those very 
rights, even at the moment of their breakdown. TIC’s moment of 
shaming before the victim of humanitarian catastrophe then, is a 
necessary moment in which a necro-geopolitical order proactively 
reaffirms itself.  
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Return to the Lagoon’s Edge 
As the passing of the UNHRC Resolution on 27 March 2014 registers 
as the success of the first phase of call for accountability, the search 
for justice for the many thousands of dead at Mullaivaikkal, I end by 
returning to the battlefields on the shores of the Nanthikadal lagoon. 
Walking this scorched ground in the days after the battle, the narrator 
of UTHR[J], a tireless and unwavering witness to the prolonged 
carnage of this thirty-year war, spoke of ‘the still eloquence of 
wastelands’, of the earth harrowed by craters and mines, littered with 
fragments of shells and cluster bombs, and marked by the fragile and 
broken remnants of human presence (UTHR [J] 2009b, p. 8).  
Five years later, this massacre ground has become, incredibly, the 
site of a luxury hotel operated by the Lankan military, and doubles as 
the Security Forces HQ for the region that remains occupied by the 
military. Named ‘Lagoon’s Edge’, the hotel is literally built on the 
bodies and bones of those who died there. It was opened with 
ceremony and triumph by none other than the President and his 
brother, the Secretary of Defense. A photograph on its Facebook 
page shows a squat structure somewhere between a safari lodge and 
a pagoda. The grounds are landscaped with memorabilia, replicas 
and crude monuments to the war. The kitsch appearance of Lagoon’s 
Edge is reminiscent of nothing so much as the simulacra produced by 
the retired Indonesian mass murderers of 1965-6 in Joshua 
Oppenheimer’s acclaimed 2012 film, The Art of Killing (Perera 2014a). 
As with Suharto’s Indonesia, in Oppenheimer’s documentary, a new 
order has been initiated in Lanka following an era of mass violence. 
Its attendant features are a lavish display and visual excess, summed 
up by Sivamohan Sumathy as an aesthetics of triumphalism (Sumathy 
2014). Advertisements and billboards dominate this landscape, as 
school textbooks are rewritten and state media units produce a rash 
of propaganda films to laud the state’s victory. Millions of dollars are 
invested in expensive PR consultants to counter international critics. 
The monuments of this new era are gleaming shopping malls, luxury 
hotels and revived monuments of mythic Sinhala heritage (Perera 
2014).  
The Lagoon’s Edge Hotel reinforces the triumph of what Sumathy 
describes as the militarising gaze that imposes itself, not only in the 
occupation of the former war zone but throughout the land:  
The militarising gaze is also a consuming gaze, accompanied by a 
certain glitz and glamour. City gentrification programmes are 
underway, displacing the urban poor. Boutique hotels, coffee 
shops, night bazaars ... take racy nightlife styles hitherto confined 
to certain fashionable enclaves ... to the streets ... where masters 
and masses mingle. Mega construction projects connect cities 
through expressways ... and newly reconstructed roads are able to 
take a visitor deep into the interior where boutique hotels and 
resorts [proliferate]. (Sumathy 2014)  
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This form of neoliberal militarisation, with its aura of global glitz and 
glamour, its massive construction projects and booming tourist and 
heritage trade, complements and consolidates the military occupation 
of the north and, in Wijeyeratne’s words, the technologies aimed at 
the ‘existential encompassment’ of Tamils and other minoritised 
subjects (2012, 403). As the military gaze is normalized throughout 
the land, the opposition to the notion of an international inquiry into 
the killings at Mullivaikkal has become noticeably less strident. The 
diplomat who led Lanka’s successful campaign to foil a condemnatory 
resolution by the UN in 2009 has been quietly removed, to return as a 
soft critic of the regime; other government apologists, too, have 
moderated their defence of the indefensible, and turned to pre-war 
nostalgia. Despite some predictable outcry at the 2014 resolution 
calling for an international inquiry, there appears to be a level of 
recognition in ruling circles that the price of rehabilitation into the 
international order may be some form of cooperation with an 
international inquiry. The presidential election of January 2015 
resulted in the shock defeat of Rajapaksa. A former minister of his 
cabinet is now President. While some moves by the new government, 
such as the replacement of the military governor of Jaffna by a 
civilian, are promising, the continuing presence of several members of 
the former government suggests that this is the ‘moderate’ face of 
regime change. Meanwhile, many LTTE supporters, too, have 
adopted new faces, remaking themselves in the image of the 
defenders of human rights to lead the call for justice for the thousands 
of dead at Mullivaikkal. As the Tamil-Canadian commentator D.B.S. 
Jeyaraj observed wryly: ‘Ostensibly the name of the LTTE game [is] ... 
now a lofty quest for justice, accountability, reconciliation and equality. 
A tragic-comic aspect of the changed scenario was the spectacle of 
accredited representatives from respected human rights organizations 
associating with yesteryear tigers … The battlefront had seemingly 
shifted to the UN Human Rights Council arena in the new venue of 
Geneva’ (Jeyaraj 2014).  
Steven Ratner, a member of the Secretary-General’s panel of experts 
on Sri Lanka, concedes in his commentary on the dismal record of the 
international attempt to provide justice: ‘The Sri Lanka case shows 
that, despite an impressive set of legal norms in place to deal with 
atrocities such as those committed in this conflict, the infusion of 
politics and the limitations of unprepared institutions can seriously 
delay prospects for accountability’ (Ratner 2012, p. 795). As I have 
attempted to show, accountability through the fora of international 
justice has been not only delayed, but fatally compromised and 
deformed by its own processes. In the Humanitarian Present, does 
the prospect of a forthcoming international investigation into the war 
represent yet another compromising victory for the lesser evil, one in 
which the most culpable parties on both sides remain unscathed: an 
accounting in which the disposable lives of Mullivaikkal yet remain 
discounted? Williams’ reflections on the need for an-other form of 
accountability, indeed for a reckoning that is critical, non-imperialist 
and non-juridical, resonate profoundly here: in this form of reckoning, 
‘our starting point should be neither the law nor any desire for a 
border lands 14:1  
23 
 
“progressive” appropriation of the law, but the mounting dead for 
whom the law was either a useless means of defense, or an 
accomplice to their murder’ (Williams 2010, p. xxxii).  
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